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PRINCIPLE OF CBDR-RC: ITS INTERPRETATION 
AND IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH NDCS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
 
Dr. Stellina Jolly* and Abhishek Trivedi** 
 




For the international community, 2015 was a momentous year in terms 
of transformative legal developments. Climate change response culminated 
in the adoption of the Paris Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), which heralded a new era in the international community’s pursuit 
of sustainability. Both of these developments are complementary; the 
climate change legal framework acknowledges sustainable development, 
and SDGs explicitly recognize the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement 
presented to the global community an objective to strengthen the global 
response to the threat of climate change, through sustainable development 
and efforts to eradicate poverty and a goal to restrict the global temperature 
increase to below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and a 
desirable goal of 1.5 degrees Celsius. The failure to achieve this target 
would seriously jeopardize States and individuals and challenge the success 
of sustainable development and SDGs. The Paris Agreement states not only 
that the achievement of the goal is essential, but the agreement must be 
implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in 
light of different national circumstances. This paper argues that the 
adoption of SDGs premised on the idea of leaving no one behind provides 
an impetus for the re-evaluation of the principle of CBDR-RC under the 
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Paris Agreement. The paper explores the possibility of a wider 
interpretation of CBDR-RC through the implementation of Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) to help the international community 
pursue SDGs. 
Keywords: CBDR-RC, Equity, NDCs, Sustainable 





Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) represent a comprehensive set 
of universal, human-oriented, integrated, and transformative goals and 
targets to achieve, with an overarching idea of sustainable development till 
2030.1 The idea of SDGs has been introduced in multiple conferences on 
the environment and development initiated by the United Nations. In the 
legal sense, the principle of sustainable development embedded in the 
concept of equity was enunciated as the leading concept of international 
environmental law with the Rio Declaration2 and Agenda 21.3 However, 
the core foundation of sustainable development depends on the 
reformulation and integration of economic, social, and environmental 
systems, and their integration is difficult to measure.4 The adoption of the 
Millennium Development Goals saw the international community pursuing 
a targeted approach to development.5 In 2012, Rio+20 brought significant 
 
* Dr. Stellina Jolly is a Senior Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Legal Studies, South 
Asian University (SAARC) and Visiting Senior Research Associate, Research Centre for 
Private International Law in Emerging Countries, University of Johannesburg. She is a 
Fulbright scholar with the University of San Francisco and a recipient of the International 
Visitors Leadership Program (IVLP). She researches in international environmental law and 
conflict of laws, stellinajolly@sau.ac.in. 
** Abhishek Trivedi, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Legal Studies, South Asian University 
(SAARC), New Delhi, India, abhishektrivedi2011@gmail.com. 
1 See G.A. Res. 70A/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, pmbl. (Sep. 2015) [hereinafter U.N. 2030 Agenda]. 
2 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug.12, 1992) 
[hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
3 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21: Programme of Action for 
Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (Jun.14, 1992). 
4 PHILLIPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 215-225 (4th 
ed., 2018); Ed Atkins, Deflective Discourse and Sustainable Development, in RETHINKING 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN TERMS OF JUSTICE: ISSUES OF THEORY, LAW, AND 
GOVERNANCE 70-87 (B. F. Pérez et al. eds., 2018); CHRISTINA VOIGT, SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT AS A PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (2009). 
5 See G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Millennium Declaration (Sep. 18, 2000). 
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changes in its approaches to sustainable development with the 
strengthening of environmental components. A long negotiation process 
resulted in the adoption of targeted sustainable development goals for the 
period from 2016 to 2030.  The adoption of SDGs, which are aspirational 
political goals for States premised on “leaving no one behind,” represents a 
significant shift toward capturing the environmental, economic, and social 
dimensions of sustainable development and guiding policy decisions 
toward achieving objective, transparent and superior development results.6 
Climate change, with its disproportionate impact on the poorest, most 
vulnerable and marginalized communities (such as people of color, women, 
children, elderly and indigenous peoples, etc.), is recognized as one of the 
biggest threats to sustainable development and the attainment of SDGs. In 
this scenario, it is important to appreciate the complementary nature of 
climate change and sustainable development; indeed, States cannot achieve 
sustainable development without addressing the disproportionate impacts 
of climate change. This is because climate change is fundamentally a social 
and political issue that challenges the global economic system founded on 
carbon-fueled growth. Climate change nullifies the efforts of nations to 
eradicate poverty, reversing decades of progress. It constitutes a threat to 
all three dimensions of sustainable development:  economic, 
environmental, and social. Thus, any failure to address climate change 
mitigation seriously undermines the attainment of sustainable 
development.7 Considering the idea of “leaving no one behind” anchored in 
the SDGs Agenda 20308 and addressing the disproportionate climate 
impacts in light of differing capacities of States, it becomes essential to 
invoke the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
(CBDR). Against this background, this paper explores the role of CBDR in 
the attainment of SDGs. CBDR is a well-founded principle of the climate 
change regime and is also applied in the context of sustainable 
development. The first part of the paper explains the links between climate 
change, sustainable development and SDGs. The second part of the paper 
analyzes the links between sustainable development and CBDR and 
explores the position of CBDR under the climate change legal framework. 
The third part of the paper analyzes the possibility of expansive 
 
6 NORICHIKA KANIE & FRANK BIERMANN, GOVERNANCE THROUGH GOALS: SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS AS GOVERNANCE INNOVATION 5 (2017).  
7 See Shinichiro Fujimori et al., Measuring the Sustainable Development Implications of 
Climate Change Mitigation, 15 ENV’T. RES. LETT. 1, 8-9 (2020); U.N. RSCH. INST. FOR 
SOC. DEV., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN TIMES OF CLIMATE CHANGE, 141-166 (2016), 
https://www.unrisd.org/flagship2016-chapter5 (detailing that  sustainable development will 
not be achievable unless climate change is addressed).  
8 U.N. 2030 Agenda, supra note 1, ¶¶ 4, 26, 48, 72, pmbl. at 1. 
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interpretation and application of CBDR within the Paris Agreement 
implementation framework for the attainment of SDGs. The emphasis will 
be on the incorporation of CBDR in the implementation of Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs). It is argued that the idea of “leaving no 
one behind” and CBDR as stipulated in the Sustainable Development 
Agenda creates a valid entry point for reinterpreting CBDR in the context 
of implementing NDCs in the Paris Agreement. 
 
I. RELATION BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
 
Human-induced climate change and the severe consequences it 
presents to the poor and vulnerable is a serious threat to sustainable 
development.9 Climate change disproportionately affects communities of 
low-income households, who are relatively more susceptible to the adverse 
impacts of climate change.10 This further exacerbates social inequality in 
terms of exposing these communities to the adverse impacts of climate 
change and at the same time reducing their ability to adapt to the damage 
caused by climate change.11 Sustainable Development Goals can hardly be 
achieved without adequately addressing the concerns of marginalized 
communities and of the poorest countries. In this regard, prioritizing the 
needs of vulnerable communities holds special attention under the climate 
change regime’s integrated concept of equity.12 The relationship between 
climate change and sustainable development was analyzed and reiterated in 
 
9 Gary W. Yohe et al., Perspectives on Climate Change and Sustainability, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE 803 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007) (reviewing projections of climate-
change-related impacts on vulnerable communities). 
10 CLAIRE MCGUIGAN ET AL., LSE CONSULTANCY PROJ., POVERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: 
ASSESSING IMPACTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE INITIATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 4-14 (2002), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-
opinion-files/3449.pdf (examining the disproportionate impact of climate change on 
developing nations); EMMANUEL SKOUFIAS ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, THE POVERTY 
IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 1 (2011); Robin Leichenko & 
Julie Silva, Climate Change and Poverty: Vulnerability, Impacts, and Alleviation Strategies, 
5 WIRES. CLIM. CHANGE 1, 2-8 (2014) (discussing the impact of climate change on poverty 
citing evidence from jurisdictions). 
11 S. Nazrul Islam & John Winkel, Climate Change and Social Inequality 2-3 (U.N. DEP’T 
OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, Working Paper No. 152 ST/ESA/2017/DWP/152) (offering 
conceptual understanding of the relationship between climate change and inequality).  
12 See generally Beverly Wright & Earthea Nance, Toward Equity: Prioritizing Vulnerable 
Communities in Climate Change 4 DUKE F. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1-23 (2012). 
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the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) third assessment 
report.13 The relationship operates in a circular fashion with climate change 
threatening development, and sustainable development providing the 
foundation for actions in mitigation and adaptation.14 For example, water is 
a primary indicator of the impacts of climate change; climate change 
threatens water quality and access. Hence, sustainable development 
strategy and sustainable management of water resources can help prevent 
exacerbating these adverse impacts and provide a foundation for climate 
adaptation and mitigation. The relationship is further cemented by the fact 
that an effective shift to climate adaptation needs to be inclusive, which 
again points to the broader agendas of sustainable development. The 
interrelation provides synergies for integrating climate actions into the 
overall development agenda. This has been underscored as part of the idea, 
objective, and mandate of the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly 
SDG-13.15 
SDG-13 focuses on strengthening the resilience and capacity of nations 
to respond to climate change.16 Goal-13 adopts not only a country-specific 
approach, by emphasizing the special needs of least developed countries 
and small island developing States (SIDS), but also an individual approach 
with special focus on women, youth and local and marginalized 
communities.17 The interconnected nature of climate change and 
sustainable development is not only reflected under SDG-13 but is 
integrated within the broader fabric of SDGs.18 Though the Paris 
Agreement does not mention SDGs explicitly, their content can be found in 
 
13 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT, in CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I, II, AND III TO THE THIRD 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 276-280, 
306-308, 351, 354 (R.T. Watson & C.R. Team ed. 2001). 
14 Christoph V. Stechow et al., Integrating Global Climate Change Mitigations Goals with 
Other Sustainability Objectives: A Synthesis, 40 (1) ANN. REV. OF ENV’T. & RES. 363, 363 
(2015); Prajal Pradhan et al., A Systematic Study of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 
Interactions, 5(11) EARTH’S FUTURE 1169, 1169–1179 (2017) (identifying the synergies and 
trade-offs based on SDG indicators for climate actions). 
15 U.N. 2030 Agenda, supra note 1, SDG-13.2. (emphasizing the need to integrate climate 
change measures into national policies, strategies and planning). 
16 Id. SDG-13.1. 
17 Id. SDG-13.b. 
18 SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. – an IPCC SPECIAL 
REPORT ON THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS 
AND RELATED GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF 
STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, AND EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY 1-32, 9–13, 26 (Valérie Masson-
Delmotte et al. eds., 2018). 
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the Agreement’s preamble and operative sections.19 For instance, SDG 
topics such as forestry, adaptation, loss-and-damage, and education are 
mentioned in the Paris Agreement’s articles 5, 7, 8, and 11(1) and 12, 
respectively.20 In addition to the operative part of the Paris Agreement, the 
Agreement’s preamble also references the subjects of several SDGs. These 
references include food security21 (SDG-2), jobs22 (SDG-8.3 and 8.9), 
health23 (SDG-3), rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, 
migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable 
situations, etc.24 Although the SDG-related issues mentioned in the 
preamble of the Paris Agreement do not entail any binding obligation, they 
are relevant for interpretive purposes.25 The clear references of sustainable 
development and SDG content in the preamble and operative part of the 
Paris Agreement indicate the intention of the international community to 
adopt an integrated approach to the implementation of the Agreement and 
SDGs. An empirical investigation into the substantive content of NDCs 
also reveals the broader inclusion of SDGs.26 
The advancement of integrated and interrelated goals requires 
transformative changes in the way societies, economies, and legal systems 
operate and respond at varying levels.  SDGs do not operate in isolation or 
in a vacuum. They are grounded in international law which provides them 
with a normative environment. SDGs are made consistent with existing 
commitments expressed in various international legal instruments. In this 
context, the mutually supportive relationship of international law is 
paramount, which has been acknowledged by the SDGs.27 For example, the 
 
19 See Francesco Sindico, Paris, Climate Change, and Sustainable Development, 6 CLIM. 
LAW 130, 140 (2016) (assessing the extent to which the Paris Outcome incorporates the 
SDGs or sustainable development concerns).  
20 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Dec. 1/CP.21: Adoption of 
the Paris Agreement, FCCC/ CP/2015/10/Add.1, 21, annex (Jan. 29, 2016), [hereinafter 
‘Paris Agreement’]. 
21 Id. at 2; SDG target 2.4 provides a link between sustainable food production, resilient 
agricultural practices, and climate change: “[b]y 2030, ensure sustainable food production 
systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and 
production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate 
change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters and that progressively 
improve land and soil quality.” U.N. 2030 Agenda, supra note 1, ¶ 2.4.  
22 Paris Agreement, supra note 20 at 2. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Max H. Hulme, Preambles in Treaty Interpretation, 164(5) U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1305-
1329 (2016). 
26 ADIS DZEBO ET AL., STOCKHOLM ENV’T. INST., THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
VIEWED THROUGH A CLIMATE LENS 1-4 (2018) (examining 7000 climate activities from 164 
Nationally Determined Contributions and showing the inclusion of SDG goals). 
27 U.N. 2030 Agenda, supra note 1, ¶ 18. 
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contents of SDG-13 were comprehensively drawn from the concrete terms 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).28 The significance of international law as a normative 
backbone for SDGs also stems from the fact that implementation of SDGs 
rests on legal forums and institutions.29 
In addition, the complementary nature of international law in the 
context of SDGs also stems from “equity” as a normative framework for 
both climate change and SDGs.30 By adopting the 2030 agenda, States 
commit to “leave no one behind” and wish to see goals and targets met for 
all nations and peoples and for all segments of society.31 Leaving no one 
behind as it relates to equity means that the specific needs of countries, 
communities, and individuals are addressed so that everyone benefits from 
sustained growth and progress.32 In the context of climate change, it is the 
poorest and most marginalized who suffer first and worst from its effects.33 
Leaving no one behind would require prioritizing and assisting the 
mitigation and adaptation efforts of the poorest countries and fighting for 
the inclusion of marginalized peoples’ voices everywhere. In this case, it is 
important to see that NDCs, which form the backbone of the Paris 
Agreement, address and pursue the goal of leaving no one behind through 
climate actions. However, given the disproportionate impact of climate 
change and differing capabilities of nations to respond to climate change, 
there is a strong case for allowing differing responsibilities for climate 
actions at the international level. The attainment of inclusive participation 
and benefits for everyone requires serious evaluation of the role of CBDR 
in the sustainable development framework and climate change legal 
 
28 Id. SDG-13. 
29 Rakhyun E. Kim, The Nexus Between International Law and the Sustainable 
Development Goals, 25(1) REV. OF EUR., COMMUNITY & INT’L ENV’T. L. 15, 16 (2016). 
30 See generally Stellina Jolly & Abhishek Trivedi, Implementing the SDG-13 Through the 
Adoption of Hybrid Law: Addressing Climate-Induced Displacement, 2 BRILL OPEN L. 69 
(2019). 
31 U.N. 2030 Agenda, supra note 1, at 1, 3 ¶ 4. 
32 See generally J. ROY ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, POVERTY ERADICATION AND 
REDUCING INEQUALITIES, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. – an IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON 
THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS AND RELATED 
GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF STRENGTHENING THE 
GLOBAL RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND 
EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY 445, 469 (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018) 
(considering the broad and multifaceted bi-directional interplay between sustainable 
development, including its focus on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality in their 
multidimensional aspects, and climate actions in a 1.5°C warmer world); Otto Spijkers, 
Intergenerational Equity and the Sustainable Development Goals, 10(11) SUSTAINABILITY  
1, 1-12 (2018). 
33 Leichenko & Silva, supra note 10. 
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regime. In this context, the concept of leaving no one behind anchored in 
the SDGs Agenda 2030 provides a strong justification for a wider 
interpretation of CBDR. 
 
II. COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITY, 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
 
The historically disproportionate contribution of countries to climate 
change34 and existing disparities amongst countries in their ability to 
respond to climate change has forced the international community to 
deviate from the classic notion of the sovereign equality of States by 
adopting a differentiation principle in terms of climate obligation.35  
Even though CBDR is most discussed in the context of climate change, 
it is important to mention that the concept of CBDR evolved as a legal 
principle in the context of sustainable development as part of the Rio 
Declaration which stated: “[I]n view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility 
that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in 
view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of 
the technologies and financial resources they command.”36 
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration explicitly integrated CBDR within 
the context of sustainable development. However, the relationship was 
expressed only in the context of historical contributions of developed 
countries to environmental degradation and their capacity to respond to 
environmental degradation. This point is a serious bone of contention 
between developed and developing nations where the latter insist on an 
expansive interpretation of CBDR to be applicable to all facets of 
sustainable development.37 It should be noted, however, that at the Rio 
conference, sustainable development was understood to encompass only 
 
34 STELLINA JOLLY & AMIT JAIN, CLIMATE CHANGE: CHANGING DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND 
POLICY 48 (2009) (highlighting the disproportionate impact of climate change). 
35 See Philippe Cullet, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 161-180 (M. Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 
2014) (explaining the evolution and development of common but differentiated 
responsibilities). 
36 Rio Declaration, supra note 2, principle 7; see also Philippe Cullet, Principle 7: Common 
but Differentiated Responsibilities, in THE RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT: A COMMENTARY 229-44 (Jorge E. Vinuales eds., 2015) (tracing the history 
of CBDR in the context of sustainable development). 
37 Lavanya Rajamani, The Changing Fortunes of Differential Treatment in the Evolution of 
International Environmental Law, 88 INT’L AFFAIRS 605, 613-614 (2012). 
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economic and environmental dimensions.38 Subsequent legal developments 
strengthened and broadened CBDR.39  The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration 
also broadened the gamut of sustainable development by explicitly adding 
social components to sustainable development.40 The Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation (JPOI) indicates that the principle of CBDR should be 
taken into account in implementing Agenda 21 and the internationally-
agreed upon development goals.41 
The Outcome Document of the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development, 2012, reaffirmed the principles of the Rio 
Declaration, including the principle of CBDR.42 It stated, “[w]e reaffirm all 
the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
 
including, inter alia, the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities, as set out in principle 7 thereof.”43 
Negotiations over the principles were contentious. While reaffirming 
the Rio Principles, the co-chair of the negotiation proposed the following: 
“[W]e also reaffirm that all the Principles contained in the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development will continue to guide the international 
community in the achievement of sustainable development and the future 
we want and will serve as the basis for cooperation, coherence and 
implementation of agreed commitments, including in this outcome.”44 The 
Group of 77 (G-77) introduced an alternative text to reaffirm the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development and all its principles, in 
 
38 Clara Nobbe, Universality, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and the Sustainable 
Development Goals 1, 3 (Stifttung Wissenschaft Und Politik, Working Paper FG 8, 2015/01, 
2015), https://www.swp berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/Nobbe_2015 
_SWP-WorkingPaper.pdf. 
39 Marie Claire C. Segger et al., Prospects for Principles of International Sustainable 
Development Law after WSSD: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, Precaution and 
Participation, 12(1) REV. OF EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENV’T. L. 54, 58 (2013). 
40 U.N. Rep. of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Resolution 1: Johannesburg 
Declaration on Sustainable Development, ¶¶ 5, 8, 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002); 
see also Ina Von Frantzius, World Summit on Sustainable Development Johannesburg 2002: 
A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Outcomes, 13(2) ENV’T. POL. 467, 471 (2004). 
41 U.N. Rep. of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Resolution 2: Plan of 
Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, ¶¶ 14, 20, 38, 39, 81, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002); see also Kevin R. Gray, World Summit on Sustainable 
Development: Accomplishments and New Directions?, 52(1) INT’L COMP. L. Q. 256, 265-66 
(2003). 
42 G.A. Res. A/RES/66/288, The Future We Want (July 27, 2012) [hereinafter Rio+20 
Outcome Document]. 
43 Id. at ¶ 15. 
44 Chee Yoke Ling, “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” Under Threat, Third 
World Network Update on Sustainable Development Conference 2012 (June 8, 2012), 
https://www.twn.my/title2/sdc2012/sdc2012.120606.htm. 
10
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particular the Principle of CBDR and equity.45 The United States and the 
developed nations were against singling out any of the Rio Principles.46 
They elucidated their position, stating that CBDR only applied in the 
context of the environment and could not be protracted into the broader 
context of development.47 However, for G-77 and China, the position was 
non-negotiable since the developing countries believed that the principle of 
CBDR is not just about the environment alone, but rather the international 
pursuit of sustainable development.48 It should also be noted that in spite of 
the acceptance of the CBDR principle in the environmental context, the 
principle was never incorporated into the global development agenda, 
including the Millennium Development Goals.49 However, this was mainly 
due to the absence of emphasis on the responsibility of northern countries 
and the general focus of north-south cooperation.50 
The notion held by developed nations that CBDR is only applicable in 
the context of global environmental goals and not for the global 
development agenda resulted in its exclusion from the initial agenda for 
negotiations leading to the adoption of SDGs.51 In addition, the concern 
was on how to reconcile the development of goals that were “global and 
universal in nature to all countries while taking into account different 
national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting 
national policies and priorities” prescribed by the Rio+20.52 Given the 
universality of SDGs and the different capabilities of countries, linking 
CBDR to the whole components of sustainable development becomes 
critical. CBDR is invoked not merely to address the historical contribution 
to environmental degradation, but also due to countries’ differing 
 
45 Id. 
46 Raymond Clemencon, Welcome to the Anthropocene: Rio+20 and the Meaning of 
Sustainable Development, 21(3) J. ENV’T. DEV. 311, 316-317 (2012); Ye Jiang, Common 
but Differentiated Responsibilities and Its Effect on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 54 
CHINA INT’L STUD. 22, 30-31 (2015) (articulating the general position of developed nations 
that common but differentiated responsibilities is not an organic part of the Post-2015 
Development Agenda). 
47 Achala C. Abeysinghe & Gilberto Arias, CBDR as a Principle of Inspiring Actions Rather 
Than Justifying Inaction in the Global Climate Change Regime, in CLIMATE CHANGE: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 235-257 (Oliver C. Ruppel et al. eds., 
2013) (articulating the operationalization of CBDR in the environmental dimensions of 
sustainable development); Ye Jiang, The CBDR Principle in the UN 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, 2(2) CHINA Q. OF INT’L STRATEGIC STUDIES 169, 170 (2016). 
48 Summary of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 13-22 JUNE 
2012, 27 (51) EARTH NEGOT. BULL. 8, 16-18, 21 (2012).  
49 Ye Jiang, supra note 47, at 173 (exploring the negotiation history on the inclusion of 
CBDR in the U.N. 2030 Agenda). 
50 Id. at 178. 
51 Id. at 172-74. 
52 Rio+20 Outcome Document, supra note 42, ¶¶ 246-47. 
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capacities.53 The historical contribution and capacity argument can be 
invoked to support the whole components of sustainable development. 
Most developing nations were colonized,54 which resulted in their 
economies being drained and undermining their prospects and ability to 
develop. Development and underdevelopment as historical processes of 
imperialist exploitation needs to occupy a larger place in the global 
negotiation agendas and require clear acknowledgment and articulate 
explanation. Even if the social components of sustainable development are 
added to the notion of CBDR, developed countries must account for their 
historical contribution to underdevelopment. Thus, equity demands that 
CBDR should be given a broad interpretation to achieve the substantive 
equality essential for the implementation of international laws regarding 
climate change.55 
During the negotiation on developing global SDGs under the mandate 
of Opening Working Group (OWG),56 the G-77 and China were of the 
opinion that the principle of CBDR applies equally to all dimensions of 
sustainable development and to the entire set of SDGs.57 The developed 
countries, however, contended that the relevance of the CBDR principle in 
its application is limited to the global environmental aspect of sustainable 
development.58 Finally, the presence of the differentiation principle in the 
context of sustainable development and its application to the 
implementation of SDGs was reaffirmed and reiterated in the OWG Report 
on sustainable development submitted to the General Assembly on  August 
14, 2014.59  Paragraph 191 of the outcome document specifically mentions 
 
53 Id. 
54 Gbedoah Richard, On Colonialism and Development – Why the Underdevelopment of the 
South Cannot Be Delinked from the Experience of the Past, 7(1) AFRICAN J. GOV. & DEV. 6-
16 (2018). 
55 See generally Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a 
New Paradigm of Inter-State Relations, 10(3) EUR. J. OF INT’L. L. 549 (1999); Philippe 
Cullet, Equity and Flexibility Mechanisms in the Climate Change Regime: Conceptual and 
Practical Issues, 8(2) REV. OF EUR., COMMUNITY & INT’L ENV’T. L. 168 (1999) (explaining 
equity in the context of climate change through the interpretation of CBDR). 
56 Rio+20 Outcome Document, supra note 42, ¶ 248. 
57 Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by H.E. Ambassador Sacha Llorentty, 
Permanent Representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the United Nations and 
Chair of the Group of 77, at the Ninth Session of the Open Working Group on Sustainable 
Development Goals (New York, Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.g77.org/statement/ 
getstatement.php?id=140303c; see also China’s Position Paper on the Development Agenda 
Beyond 2015, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLES’ REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Sept. 
22, 2013), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1078984.shtml. 
58 Pamela S. Chasek et al., Getting to 2030: Negotiating the Post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Agenda, 25(1) REV. OF EUR., COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 5, 9 (2016). 
59 See G.A. Res. A/68/970, Rep. of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on 
Sustainable Development Goals, ¶¶ 5, 8, 12, 13, 18 (Aug. 12, 2014). 
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CBDR in the context of climate change.60 In addition, paragraph 247 of the 
outcome document espouses that the SDGs, which are global and universal 
in nature, should be applicable to all countries while taking into account 
different national realities, capacities and levels of development and 
respecting national policies and priorities.61 Though the term CBDR is not 
explicitly stated in the outcome document, which refers instead to national 
realities and capabilities, the outcome document has adopted a dynamic 
principle of differentiation applicable in all contexts of sustainable 
development.62 
The inclusion of differentiation constituted a decisive step towards the 
completion of the U.N. 2030 Agenda.  CBDR is crucial for strengthening 
the means of implementation of SDGs and also for promoting the 
revitalization of global cooperation for sustainable development. The 
indivisible and integrated nature of SDGs has opened the possibility of 
interpreting and implementing the CBDR principle as applying equally to 
all dimensions of sustainable development and to the broader framework of 
SDGs. In this context, the next part of the article explores the contours of 
CBDR under the climate change legal framework and its contextualization 
within sustainable development. 
 
III. PRINCIPLE OF ‘COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED 
RESPONSIBILITY’ UNDER THE CLIMATE LAW FRAMEWORK 
 
The principle of CBDR has been a contentious issue in the climate 
change regime, with developed countries arguing that CBDR should be 
based on “capabilities”, while developing countries emphasize the term 
“responsibility.”63  Ultimately, the debate resulted in a compromise in the 
form of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities” (CBDR-RC) as bases for differentiation. 
The CBDR-RC is mentioned under the preamble64 and article 3 of the 
UNFCCC65 as one of its guiding principles. The Kyoto Protocol, which 
supplemented the Convention, applied an Annex-based model of 
 
60 Rio+20 Outcome Document, supra note 42, ¶ 191. 
61 Id. ¶ 247. 
62 Nobbe, supra note 38, at 1-12; Pieter Pauw et al., Different Perspectives on Differentiated 
Responsibilities: A State-of-the-Art Review of the Notion of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities in International Negotiations 1-76, 48-50 (GERMAN DEVELOPMENT 
INSTITUTE DISCUSSION PAPER 6/2014, 2014), https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/ 
DP_6.2014.pdf. 
63 DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 27 (2017). 
64 UNFCCC, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, pmbl. ¶ 6 (May 9, 1992). 
65 Id., art. 3.1. 
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differentiation.66 The idea of CBDR was problematic from the very 
beginning as many of the developed nations, especially the U.S., opposed 
the idea of non-binding obligations on some of the developing nations, like 
China and India.67 The opposition took a concrete turn especially from the 
Bali Conference of Parties (CoP), which started working on the post-Kyoto 
commitments.68 The idea that differentiation requires flexibility and 
dynamism was moot.69 Following the climate negotiations, State Parties in 
the Durban platform embraced the notion of “intended nationally 
determined contributions” (INDCs), which continued in Warsaw (COP-19) 
where it was decided to put INDCs at the heart of the future climate 
agreement.70 
Finally, the Paris Agreement, while diluting the traditional binary 
understanding of CBDR-RC,71 approached what many experts call dynamic 
differentiation, which considers different national circumstances, 
capacities, and vulnerabilities and tailors differentiation to the specificities 
of mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building and 
 
66 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, arts. 2, 3 (Dec. 11, 1997) 
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].  
67 Rowena Maguire, The Role of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in the 2020 
Climate Regime: Evolving a New Understanding of Differential Commitments, 7(4) CAR. & 
CL. L. REV. 260, 263, 266 (2013); Paul. G. Harris, Common But Differentiated 
Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and United States Policy, 2 NYU ENV’T. L. J. 27, 28 
(1999).  
68 Lavanya Rajamani, From Berlin to Bali and Beyond: Killing Kyoto Softly?, 57(4) INT’L & 
COMP. L. Q.  909, 911, 923 (2008) (explaining the controversial negotiating positions of 
countries for the post Kyoto commitments). 
69 Jorge Vinuales, Balancing Effectiveness and Fairness in the Redesign of the Climate 
Change Regime, 24(1) LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 225, 245 (2011) (exploring the differing position 
of nations concerning fairness and the developed nations perspectives of flexibility for all 
nations). 
70 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.19: Further Advancing the Durban Platform, UN Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (Jan. 31. 2014). 
71 The principle of CBDR-RC is arguably diluted under the Paris Agreement in a sense that 
it adopted a self-differentiation approach, in contrast to an annex-based approach of 
differentiation tailored by the Kyoto Protocol. The weakening of the differentiation principle 
under the Paris Agreement has been seen by a few commentators as a positive sign of 
evolution of CBDR-RC principle towards a flexible and dynamic framework. See generally, 
S. Maljean-Dubois, The Paris Agreement: A New Step in the Gradual Evolution of 
Differential Treatment in the Climate Regime?, 25(2) REV. OF EUR., COMMUNITY & INT’L 
ENV’T. L. 151 (2016); see also Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in Environmental 
Law: Addressing Critiques and Conceptualizing the Next Steps, 5 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T. L. 
305 (2016) (taking a different approach to the CBDR-RC principle, arguing that, in a world 
where inequalities remain, the differentiation principle should be developed around new 
environmental and social bases and must be applied in all aspects of sustainable 
development). 
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transparency.72 All of these areas are directly related to the various 
dimensions of sustainable development and sustainable development goals. 
It would be legally implausible to argue that the “differentiation” under the 
Paris Agreement goes without touching upon the aspects of sustainable 
development. In other words, even though the Paris Agreement has diluted 
the traditional approach of CBDR-RC, the present dynamic of 
differentiation is closely related to multiple dimensions of sustainable 
development. 
 
A. Paris Agreement, Sustainable Development, and SDGs 
 
The preamble of the Paris Agreement emphasizes the relationship of 
climate change actions and responses to equitable access to sustainable 
development and the eradication of poverty.73 Sustainable development and 
poverty eradication are the overarching goals of the UN Agenda 2030.74 
Article 2 of the Agreement goes further by setting an ambitious goal of 
limiting  global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius in the context of 
sustainable development.75 The Parties under article 4 have agreed to 
achieve and implement the goals of the Paris Agreement including NDCs 
on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development.76 In 
this way, sustainable development provides a context for the State Parties 
to achieve and implement the goals of the Agreement.77 
 
72 Christina Voigt & Felipe Ferreira, ‘Dynamic Differentiation’: The Principles of CBDR-
RC, Progression and Highest Possible Ambition in the Paris Agreement, 5(2) TRANSNAT’L 
ENV’T. L. 285, 303 (2016) (analyzing the ‘dynamic differentiation’ as built into the 
architecture of the Paris Agreement); Lavanya Rajamani, The 2015 Paris Agreement: 
Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-Obligations, 28(2) J. OF INT’L ENV’T. L. 337, 358 
(2016); Lavanya Rajamani, Ambitions and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: 
Interpretative possibilities and Underlying Politics, 65(2) INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 493 (2016) 
(exploring ambition and differentiation as articulated in the test of the Agreement and its 
interpretative possibilities and underlying politics). 
73 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, pmbl. ¶ 8. 
74 Lynda M. Collins, Sustainable Development Goals and Human Rights: Challenges and 
Opportunities, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS: LAW, THEORY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
72-78 (Duncan French ed., 2018). 
75 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2.1. 
76 Id., art. 4.1. 
77 Since sustainable development and the contents of SDGs form part of the preamble and 
operative part of the Paris Agreement and provide a context for the implementation of the 
Agreement, they could be used in several ways including in the interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the Agreement. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(1) (May 23, 1969) (saying that “A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”); see Hulme, supra note 25, at 1296-
1329 (discussing the relevance of preamble text in the interpretation of the main text of a 
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Parties are further allowed to seek international cooperation in the 
implementation of their NDCs,78 and thus, while engaging in such 
cooperative mechanisms, they are required to promote sustainable 
development, inter alia.79 The Agreement further establishes a link 
between global goals on adaptation with those of sustainable development 
in the sense that the domestic adaptation measures adopted by the States 
should be in tune with a view to contributing to sustainable development.80 
Moreover, Parties under the Paris Agreement have explicitly recognized 
the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss-and-
damage.81 Interestingly, SDG-13, on the other hand, also requires States to 
adopt domestic measures in their implementation of mitigation and 
adaptation goals.82 Thus, it is incumbent upon States to ensure that their 
domestic implementation policies regarding the Paris Agreement and SDGs 
are mutually supportive and do not result in a fragmented approach.83 
 
treaty and in the reconciliation of the text-and-context and object-and-purpose approaches); 
see e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, 12, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) (in this case, the 
Appellate Body looked at the preamble text of the WTO Agreement while giving an 
interpretation of article XX of the GATT. It noted that “An environmental purpose is 
fundamental to the application of article XX, and such a purpose cannot be ignored, 
especially since the preamble to the [WTO Agreement] … acknowledge that the rules of 
trade should be in accordance with the objective of the sustainable development.”); J. 
KLABBERS, Treaties and their Preambles, in CONCEPTUAL AND CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE MADERN LAW OF TREATIES 172-200 (M. Bowman & D. Kritsiotis eds., 2018). 
78 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 6.1. 
79 Id., art. 6.2. 
80 Id., art. 7.1. 
81 Id., art. 8.1. 
82 U.N. 2030 Agenda, supra note 1, SDG 13.2. 
83 Mutually supportive role of SDGs and the Paris Agreement help influence the countries to 
adopt an integrated approach and avoid fragmentation in their policy design regarding 
climate change. As for the relevance of an integrated and coherent approach in relation to 
the Paris Agreement and the SDGs. See generally  David Griggs et al., An Integrated 
Framework for Sustainable Development Goals, 19(40) ECOL. SOC. 49 (2014); William 
Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and The Challenges of Global Environmental Law: 
Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32(2) U. OF PA. J. OF INT’L L. 457, 513 (2010) 
(analyzing global environmental law in the context of a plural, fragmented international 
legal order); CLARA BRANDI ET AL., GERMAN DEV. INST., THE CASE FOR CONNECTING THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT AND THE 2030 AGENDA FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 1-4 (2017) (exploring the enormous potential for co-benefits to 
arise from the mutually supportive implementation processes of the 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) elaborated in the 2030 Agenda and the Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) underpinning the legally binding Paris Agreement); TARA SHINE, 
SWEDISH INT’L DEV. COOPERATION AGENCY, INTEGRATING CLIMATE ACTION INTO NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: COHERENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND 
AGENDA 2030, A GUIDE TO SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT PART 
THREE 1-15 (2017); UNDP, GUIDELINES TO SUPPORT COUNTRIES REPORTING ON THE 
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The explicit references to sustainable development and SDG content in 
the preamble and operative part of the Paris Agreement indicate the 
seriousness attached by the climate change regime to the operationalization 
of the Agreement in the context of sustainable development.84 The 
references to sustainable development and SDG content also points to the 
need to adopt an integrated approach to the implementation of the 
Agreement and SDGs, with a strong mandate in the field of adaptation, 
loss-and-damage, and support mobilization. 
In this scenario, the question is whether the Paris Agreement, with its 
diluted form of the CBDR-RC principle, is capable of attaining the climate 
goal of 2-degrees Celsius and the ambitious goal of 1.5-degrees Celsius in 
the context of sustainable development. This article reiterates the position 
of the Paris Agreement that the implementation of the Agreement is to be 
in the context of sustainable development and equity. With this in mind, the 
next section illustrates the significance attached to SDGs in the NDCs 
submitted by State Parties. 
 
IV. INCORPORATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN 
THE NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Implementation of NDCs and building climate resilience capacity are 
not exclusive to the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals but are 
strongly connected to the broader concept of sustainable development and 
contribute substantially to the achievement of SDGs. The mutually 
supportive nature of the two agendas is clear—i.e., delivering on NDCs 
will help countries achieve their SDGs, and achieving the SDGs will 
facilitate countries’ efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Further, 
since the NDCs process is cyclical and will be assessed collectively 
 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 22 (2017); Norchika Kanie et al., Introduction: Global 
Governance through Goal Setting,’ in GOVERNANCE THROUGH GOALS: SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS AS GOVERNANCE INNOVATION 1-28 (Norchika Kanie & Frank 
Biermann eds., 2017). 
84 It needs to be emphasized that although the U.N. Agenda 2030 is a soft law instrument 
and that the SDGs are not legally binding, they are nevertheless of great importance in many 
ways including informing the interpretation of the Paris Agreement, influencing the general 
international law-making process and the content of international law, and most importantly 
helping to define the standards of good behavior of the states in a given context. See 
generally Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 
12(2) MICH. J. OF INT’L L. 420, 431-35 (1990); Tadensz Grnchalla-Wesierski, A Framework 
for Understanding “Soft Law”, 30 MCGILL L. J. 38, 52-60, 70-79 (1984); Alan E. Boyle, 
Some Reflection on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 901, 
904-914 (1999) (discussing the legal status of treaty provisions and soft laws, this 
understanding is important to appreciate inclusion of terminologies in different parts of the 
treaty or agreement). 
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through global stocktaking “in light of equity,”85 the SDG lens can help 
countries develop more comprehensive and ambitious targets while taking 
into account how NDC implementation can contribute to achieving 
multiple goals of the U.N. 2030 Agenda.86 As with the SDGs, the 
achievement by a Party of its NDCs is not a legally binding obligation, but 
governments are expected to take ownership and establish national 
frameworks for their targets.87 The Stockholm Institute studies show that 
NDCs include a large number of climate activities that are also relevant to 
achieving multiple SDGs.88 As of now, 186 State Parties have submitted 
their first NDCs and many States mention in their NDCs, directly or 
indirectly, concerns about sustainable development and SDGs. 
For instance, India’s NDC refers to sustainable development and 
sustainable development goals of poverty eradication, food security, and 
nutrition, universal access to education and health, gender equality and 
women empowerment, water and sanitation, energy, employment, 
sustainable urbanization and new human settlements, and the means of 
implementation for enhanced actions.89 India’s broad policy framework on 
environment and climate change as highlighted in its NDC and laid down 
by the National Environmental Policy (NEP, 2006) and National Action 
Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC, 2008) along with several other national 
strategies and policies, such as Energy Conservation Act (2001), focus on 
achieving sustainable development with the imperatives of economic and 
social justice.90 
 
85 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 14.1. 
86 See Eliza Northrop et al., Examining the Alignment Between the Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions And Sustainable Development Goals, WORLD RESOURCE INST. 1, 
2, 13 (2016), https://www.wri.org/publication/examining-alignment-between-intended-
nationally-determined-contributions-and-sustainable (demonstrating that climate actions 
communicated in the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris 
Agreement have the potential to generate mutual benefits with at least 154 of the 169 SDG 
targets); Jennifer Huang, What Can the Paris Agreement’s Global Stocktake Learn from the 
Sustainable Development Goals?, 12(3) CAR. & CL. L. REV. 218- 228 (2018) (undertaking a 
review of the potential similarities and differences in the review, reporting cycles, and 
outcomes, measuring progress, managing technical expert input, sharing knowledge, 
information and experience, of SDGs and climate change and suggesting that SDGs could 
provide some relevant lessons for international climate negotiations).  
87 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4(2); see generally Christina Voigt, The Paris 
Agreement: What is the Standard of Conduct for Parties?, 26 QUESTIONS OF INT’L L. 17, 19-
20 (2016).  
88 See generally, Dzebo, supra note 26.  
89 India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: Working towards Climate Justice, 
UNFCCC 4 (Oct. 2, 2016), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx 
(follow “India First NDC” English language hyperlink). 
90 Id. at 7. 
18
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol11/iss3/3
Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 
326 
Similarly, Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, while adopting 
a low carbon pathway, have mainstreamed climate and environmental 
considerations with a sustainable development agenda.91 The Maldives has 
even made the explicit reference of sustainable development as a context 
for its conditional target of a 24% reduction in Green House Gases (GHGs) 
below business as usual (BAU) for the year 2030.92 Thus, the Maldives  
believes that its domestic budgetary spending on addressing climate change 
would remain an additional burden towards the achievement of sustainable 
development.93 The group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
(BRICS) countries have also mentioned sustainable development as a 
context and basis in the formulation and implementation of their NDCs 
based on equity and equitable access to sustainable development. For 
instance, South Africa believes that the principles of equity and sustainable 
development are the basis of its NDCs, and equity applies to adaptation, 
mitigation and all forms of investment and support.94 In this context, South 
Africa further mentions that equity, economic and social development, and 
poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities for the effective 
implementation of its NDCs.95 Brazil is also committed to enhancing its 
contribution towards global efforts to hold the increase in global average 
temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels in the context of 
sustainable development and access to financial and technological means.96 
Concerns about sustainable development are not specific to the NDCs 
of developing and least developed nations. Many member countries to the 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) have increasingly aligned their 
climate change policy with sustainable development objectives. For 
instance, Trinidad and Tobago, while adopting a low carbon development 
plan through the National Climate Change Policy, is willing to achieve an 
 
91 Afghanistan’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 3-4 (Sept. 21, 
2015); Sri Lanka’s Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 1 (Sept., 2016); Nepal’s 
Nationally Determined Contributions, UNFCCC 5, 9 (Oct. 2016); Pakistan’s Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 1 (Nov. 10, 2016). NDC submissions for 
each country can be accessed at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx. 
92 Maldives’ Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 3 (Sept. 2015), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Maldives First NDC” 
hyperlink). 
93 Id. at 10. 
94 South Africa’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 10 (Nov. 1, 
2016), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “South Africa 
First NDC” hyperlink). 
95 Id. at 7. 
96 Brazil’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution towards Achieving the Objectives 
of the UNFCCC, Additional Information on the INDC for Clarification Purposes Only, 
UNFCCC 1 (Sep. 21, 2016), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx 
(follow “Brazil’s First NDC” hyperlink). 
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optimal energy mix with the lowest GHGs emissions in order to ensure a 
sustainable development path with significant co-benefits in terms of 
enhancing its ability to cope with and adapt to the adverse impacts of 
climate change.97 In contrast, Tuvalu believes that climate change is a 
cross-cutting development issue, which seriously undermines its efforts 
towards sustainable development and climate change resilience, and 
threatens the survival and sovereignty of the nation.98 
The assessed NDCs broadly reveal not only climate action goals but 
also the strong alignment and de jure sustainable development plans deeply 
rooted in the U.N. 2030 Agenda.99 Two things are important to note here. 
First, these countries viewed sustainable development as an objective to be 
achieved in all three areas of environmental, economic and social 
development. Second, these countries provided sustainable development as 
a context and basis for NDCs implementation in the areas of not only 
mitigation but also adaptation, and support. SDGs rooted in the principle of 
leaving no one behind have been given a place of prominence in a majority 
of NDCs reiterating the complementarity of the goals specified in the two 
regimes. The strong emphasis on sustainable development in the NDCs 
reflects the intention of countries to advance the implementation of the 
Paris Agreement in the context of sustainable development. It should also 
be emphasized that case law jurisprudence has highlighted the 
commitments of governments to meet climate change targets set up by the 
Paris Agreement with the objective of contributing to the achievement of 
sustainable development.100 These cases vividly highlight the significance 
 
97 Trinidad and Tobago’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 2, 3 
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow 
“Trinidad and Tobago First NDC” hyperlink). 
98 Tuvalu’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, UNFCCC 9, 10 (Nov. 27, 2015), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Tuvalu First NDC” 
hyperlink). 
99 Dzebo, supra note 26, at 1-2. 
100 See generally Gloucester Resources Ltd. v. Minister for Planning, NSWLEC 7, 491, 525-
49, 556, 664, 695 (2019). In this case, the Court rejected the approval of a proposed open-
cut coal mine – Gloucester Resources Ltd – based on the grounds of social, environmental 
and climate change considerations. The court noted that the exploitation of the coal 
resources in the Gloucester Valley would not be a sustainable use and would cause 
substantial environmental and social harm, and that the project’s GHGs emissions would 
contribute to global climate change degradation. Therefore, the Planning Department under 
the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act of 1979 should consider the climate 
change impacts, including the cumulative upstream and downstream GHGs emissions, of 
the project because the Act together with its regulations require the considerations of the 
principles of ecologically sustainable development which can encompass climate change 
impacts. Finally the court held that the Gloucester Valley coal mine project is not a 
sustainable use as it would cause adverse impacts on climate change and incur high 
environmental and social costs. See Lesley Hughes, The Rocky Hill Decision: A Watershed 
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attached by legal systems in responding to the Paris Agreement targets 
connecting some SDGs to the concept of sustainable development. 
Since international law forms the backbone of SDG implementation, 
the achievement of climate goals and SDGs for everyone requires a 
stronger focus on equity and in the climate context, the expansive 
interpretation of CBDR in NDCs. The following sections enumerate how 
an expansionist interpretation of CBDR can be applicable to the 
implementation of NDCs under the Paris Agreement, as NDCs constitute 
the primary mechanism of implementation strategy under the Paris 
Agreement. 
 
V. INCORPORATING CBDR IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NDCs 
 
The concept of NDCs under the Agreement lies at the heart of the 
climate change regime, where State Parties are given extensive discretion 
to decide their GHG reduction target domestically and report them 
internationally. Article 4 of the Agreement deals in detail with the issue of 
mitigation, i.e. NDCs, where each State is required to “prepare, 
communicate and maintain successive” NDCs that it intends to achieve.101 
The methods of implementation of these NDCs are chosen by concerned 
State Parties by adopting any domestic measures including legislation, 
rules, regulations, or any other policy measures. The overarching issues of 
the Paris Agreement: fairness, transparency framework, global stock-take, 
ambitious cycle, and means of implementation form the entry points for 
incorporating CBDR differentiation in NDCs. This article, while arguing 
for the expansive interpretation of CBDR, does not advocate for the 
retention of the binary divide between Annex countries. This article 
promotes the concretization of the developed, developing and vulnerable 
categories of countries specified under the Paris Agreement. The call for an 
expansionist interpretation of CBDR in NDCs should not be understood in 
the limited context of simply achieving the climate temperature goal of 2 
degrees Celsius. Instead, it is more about the process and methods of 
 
for Climate Change Action, 37(3) J. OF ENV’T. & NAT. RES. L. 341 (2019); Plan B Earth v. 
Secretary of State for Transport, EWCA Civ. 214 (2020) (UK). In this case the UK appellate 
court declined the decision of the government approving an expansion of Heathrow 
International Airport without considering its commitment to meeting the Paris Agreement 
goals. The court held that since the Paris Agreement goals form part of the “Government 
Policy,” the Secretary must consider and address the Paris Agreement goals during the 
preparation of the Airport National Policy Statement. And since the government failed to 
consider the Paris Agreement goals, it acted in violation of the Planning Act of 2008 and the 
requirement to undertake a strategic environmental assessment. See also JACQUELINE PEEL 
& HARI OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: LESSONS AND PATHWAYS (2017).  
101 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4.2. 
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achieving that goal based on equity and in light of sustainable development 
and efforts to eradicate poverty. Given the complementary relationship and 
significance of SDGs and climate change, fair and equitable preparation of 
NDCs is crucial in the attainment of SDG targets, as the implementation 
and operationalization of the Paris Agreement is mainly envisaged through 
NDCs, which outline countries’ contributions to reduce or limit GHGs 
emissions. Without an adequate reference to and incorporation of equity in 
NDCs, the goal of the Paris Agreement and the hope of attaining the SDGs 
would be impossible to achieve. With this in mind, the following 
subsections will explore the ways and methods of incorporating CBDR and 
promoting equity in the implementation of NDCs. 
 
A. Promoting Equity through Fairness Requirement of NDCs 
 
The effective implementation of the Paris Agreement is envisaged in 
the context of sustainable development and equity.102 Hence, it is 
imperative that the process leading to the preparation, accounting, 
implementation and compliance procedures relating to NDCs includes 
considerations promoting equity and fairness. An assessment of the Paris 
Agreement and the agreed Paris Rulebook for implementation shows an 
entry point for incorporating equity and fairness. Despite the 
interdisciplinary and philosophical nature associated with the idea of 
equity, most scholars have considered the incorporation of equity essential 
for the dynamic operation of climate governance.103 It is to be noted that 
equity under the climate change regime is operationalized through the 
application of the principle of CBDR-RC.104 Though the UNFCCC has 
never formally adopted any criteria to measure equity, considerations 
implicit in the UNFCCC can be used to infuse the virtues of CBDR-RC in 
the implementation of NDCs. 
The Paris Agreement especially mentions that each State is required to 
explain the factors and parameters regarding the fairness and ambitious 
consideration, and how the NDCs will contribute to the collective goals of 
 
102 Id., arts. 2.1, 2.2. 
103 See Rebecca J. Howard et al., Which “Fairness”, for Whom, and Why? An Empirical 
Analysis of Plural Notions of Fairness in Fairtrade Carbon Projects, using Q methodology, 
56 ENV’T. SCI. & POL’Y. 100-109 (2016); Mark Fleurbaey et al., Sustainable Development 
and Equity, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 283, 317-321 (O. Edenhofer et al. eds., 2014); Bodansky et al., supra 
note 63, at 26-30, 51-53; BENOIT MAYER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
27-31 (2018). 
104 UNFCCC, supra note 64, art. 3.1. 
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the Agreement and the Convention.105  However, it is built upon the 
flexibility granted to each country to interpret the extent of their proposed 
commitments and the parameters they consider equitable. This provision 
can form an entry point for assessing the incorporation of equity in the 
implementation of NDCs. In the absence of any common parameters 
applicable to assessing the adequacy of evaluation by each State Party, it is 
imperative that common parameters be developed. CBDR could be one of 
the guiding principles for promoting fairness because equity and fairness 
under the climate change regime are channeled through application of the 
principle of CBDR-RC.106 Any method or benchmark for the evaluation of 
NDCs mitigation efforts should be fairly balanced between equity and 
stringent requirements for achieving the temperature goal of 2 degree 
Celsius. This is not to argue for sacrificing the Paris Agreement goal of 2 
degrees Celsius on the altar of equity. This paper argues that the process of 
achieving the 2 degrees Celsius goal is equally as important an 
achievement as the goal itself. The Paris Agreement also clearly reflects 
this point when it states that implementation should reflect equity and the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.107 Studies have 
focused on providing a comprehensive overview of equity criteria ranging 
from allocation-based, objective-based, and process-based criteria, 
applicable in the context of climate change implementation.108 In this 
regard, it should be pointed out that though most of the controversy 
surrounding fairness is centered around responsibility and capacity, the 
decisive point of fairness conceptions in climate negotiations centered 
around whether a country is listed as an ‘Annex’ country under the Kyoto 
 
105 UNFCCC, ‘Decision 4/CMA.1: Further Guidance in relation to the mitigation section of 
decision 1/CP.21, FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.1 annex I, sect. 6 (Mar.19, 2019). 
106 See Friedrich Soltau, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY 
187 (2009) (mentioning that the principle of CBDR ‘gives effect to conceptions of equity 
and fairness in international environmental law’ generally and climate change law 
particularly); see also Daria Shapovalova, In Defence of the Principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities, in DEBATING CLIMATE LAW 2-4 
(Benoit Mayer and Alexander Zahar eds., 2021, forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3652184 (advancing the argument that the principle of 
CBDR-RC is indispensable for the achievement of equity under climate change regime). 
107 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2.2. 
108 Yann Robiou du Pont et al., Equitable Mitigation to Achieve the Paris Agreement Goals, 
7(1) NATURE CLIM. CHANGE 38-43 (2017) (study identifying global cost-optimal mitigation 
scenarios consistent with the Paris Agreement goals and allocating their emissions 
dynamically to countries according to equity approaches); Joeri Rogelj et al., Paris 
Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost to Keep Warming Well below 2 °C, 534 
NATURE 631-639 (2016). 
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Protocol.109 This is because the differentiation under the Kyoto protocol 
was characterized by a firewall with legally binding and country-specific, 
quantitative mitigation targets for Annex I Parties only.110 The shift in 
structure towards self-differentiation in the Paris Agreement through NDCs 
mainly resulted from a lack of consensus on fundamental burden-sharing 
principles.111 Under the Paris Agreement, Parties are obliged to submit 
NDCs every five years and are requested to justify their contribution as 
“fair and ambitious” through self-differentiation.112 Article 2 of the Paris 
Agreement specifically directs that implementation. Commitments should 
“reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national 
circumstances.”113 
Rajamani and Bodansky write that as for the long-standing contentious 
issue of equity, although the Paris Rulebook does not prescribe parameters 
for assessing how States’ NDCs are to be fair and ambitious, the mere 
requirement that countries have to provide explanations and justifications 
about how their NDCs are fair and ambitious might enable and open the 
door to more focused criticism by others.114 It gives an opportunity for 
public scrutiny of NDCs. Thus, the question of fairness in effort-sharing 
will continue to be relevant in the future cycle established by the 
Agreement. Therefore, it is crucial that climate negotiations approach the 
issue with a dynamic prism since the Annex division is not applicable. One 
of the plausible approaches in this direction could be to fix an emission 
allowance on the basis of specific equity principles discussed in the IPCC 
AR5,115 without necessarily compromising the equity considerations and 
 
109 See generally, Benito Muller, EQUITY IN CLIMATE CHANGE: THE GREAT DIVIDE (Oxford 
Inst. for Energy Studies, 2002) 1-2, 13-15 (explaining the north–south perception with 
regard to equity in climate change and highlighting the perspective of Annex and non–
Annex countries). An assumption can be made that more than the philosophical 
underpinnings of equity, the concerns of the countries were on the division between Annex 
and non-Annex countries since the non-Annex countries were exempted from quantified 
emission. The exemption granted to countries like China and India became the primary 
reason for the United States’ non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 
110 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 66, arts. 2.1 and 3.1; see also, Bodansky, supra note 63, 
at 165-69 (detailing the nuances of differentiation under the Kyoto Protocol). 
111 Hugh Breakey, COP20’s Ethical Fallout: The Perils of Principles Without Dialogue, 18 
(2) ETHICS, POL’Y & ENV’T. 155-168 (2015). 
112 See Draft decision to the Paris Agreement, supra note 20, ¶ 27.  
113 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2.  
114 Lavanya Rajamani & Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Rulebook: Balancing the International 
Prescriptiveness with National Discretion, 68 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 1023, 1031 (2019). 
115 Leon Clarke et al., Assessing Transformation Pathways, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: 
MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE – CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 413, 457, 
478 (O. Edenhofer et al. eds, 2014); see also Glen P. Peters et al., Measuring a Fair and 
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efficacy requirements of NDCs. These equity principles are reflective of 
several equitable considerations including historical responsibility, equal 
individual rights, economic capability, cost-effectiveness, legitimate right 
to development, responsibility, capacity and need, equal cumulative per 
capita emissions, and staged approaches.116 In this regard, it may be pointed 
out that the reference to historical responsibility need not merely refer to  
emissions from the beginning of the industrial revolution and the automatic 
exclusion of recent years’ emissions. Historical responsibility can be 
looked at from a dynamic perspective as current emissions represent future 
historical responsibility. Thus, the equity criteria would need to be viewed 
from a progressive perspective, requiring regular evaluation. Scholars have 
empirically analyzed selected NDCs based on a host of parameters 
including the criteria proposed above. These studies have revealed that the 
NDCs of the U.S. and the European Union lack ambition with respect to 
responsibility and that China’s NDC projection falls short of satisfying any 
approach in 2030.117 Further, the study conducted by Xunzhang Pan, et al. 
comparing the NDCs of the top six emitters, jointly accounting for about 
70% of the world’s CO2 emissions, revealed that the NDCs of four 
developed countries, including the United States, lack ambition with 
respect to most allocations under 2°C and all under 1.5°C, indicating the 
need to increase the targets under all the components of NDCs 
substantially.118 These empirical evaluations of NDCs and revelations about 
their lack of ambition further indicate the need to evolve a mechanism of 
common parameters against which nations' efforts can be measured. 
The above-mentioned equity considerations to assess the fairness 
requirements of NDCs are significant for many reasons. Currently, NDCs 
reflect a national view on what a single country’s contribution should be, 
both in terms of capability and fairness.119 The combined perspective of 
 
Ambitious Climate Agreement using Cumulative Emissions, 10 ENV’T. RES. LETT. 1, 3 
(2015) (allocating global emissions to keep global warming below 2 °C by 2100, two 
approaches are followed: an “equity” approach based on population, and an “inertia” 
approach based on current shares of global emissions). 
116 Niklas Höhne et al., Regional GHG Reduction Targets Based on Effort Sharing: A 
Comparison of Studies, 14(1) CLIM. POL’Y, 122-147 (2014); M. Davide et al., Fairness in 
NDCs: Comparing Mitigation Efforts from an Equity Perspective, UNFCCC 1-16 (Oct. 
2017), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/312_Fairness%20in%20NDCs.%20 
Comparing%20mitigation%20efforts%20from%20an%20equity%20perspective.pdf; X. Pan 
et al., Exploring Fair and Ambitious Mitigation Contributions under the Paris Agreement 
Goals, 74 ENV’T. SCI. & POL’Y 49-56 (2017). 
117 Davide et al., supra note 116, at 9-12. 
118 Xunzhang Pan et al., Comparing and Evaluating the Nationally Determined 
Contributions of the Top Six Emitters Under the Paris Agreement Goals, 16 CHINESE J. 
OF POP. RES. & ENV’T. 211, 211-19 (2018). 
119 Davide, supra note 116, at 12. 
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each nation must advance the Paris Agreement’s core objective in a manner 
reflective of equity and the principle of CBDR-RC, in the light of different 
national circumstances.120 Reference to commonly defined equity criteria 
can objectively advance different national circumstances. Further, these 
considerations and approaches can be used to compare emissions targets in 
NDCs reflecting differential equity; such an assessment could be the 
foundation for reviewing NDCs by 2030 and dividing the emissions gap 
amongst countries equitably. The current pattern of self-certification based 
on self-selected benchmarks can hardly be considered to advance the 
ambitious nature of the Paris Agreement.121 Commonly identified equity 
parameters would help account for the nuanced categorization involved in 
fairness considerations and the ambitious nature of the Paris Agreement. 
 
B. Promoting Equity through International Support and 
Conditional NDCs 
 
Equity enacted through CBDR-RC is widely argued as one of the 
justifications for providing international support122 for two broad reasons. 
First, “solidarity” between higher-capacity countries and countries with less 
capacity to deal with climate change.123 Second, those who have 
contributed the most to global GHG emissions have the highest 
responsibility and should support those who have contributed the least and 
who are generally likely to face worse impacts.124 Providing international 
 
120 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 2, 4.1, 4.3. 
121 Harald Winkler et al., Countries Start to Explain How Their Climate Contributions Are 
Fair: More Rigour Needed, 18(1) INT’L ENV’T. AGREEMENTS: POL. L. & ECON. 99, 99-115 
(2018) (studying 163 INDCs and analyzing how countries have applied different self-
selected equity parameters (such as countries’ small share in global emissions, per capita 
emissions, and vulnerability argument) to explain the equity of mitigation and adaptation in 
their respective INDCs. They find that aggregate effect of INDCs will not be sufficient to 
keep global temperature increase well below 2 degrees Celsius). 
122 In this paper, international support is interchangeably used as “means of implementation” 
or “support.” International support under the U.N. climate change regime for the purpose of 
this paper is understood in terms of providing financial assistance and facilitating 
technology transfer to, and strengthening and investing in capacity-building measures of, 
developing countries. 
123 Rob Dellink et al., Sharing the Burden of Financing Adaptation to Climate Change, 
19(4) GLOBAL ENV’T. CHANGE 411, 411-21 (2009) (mentioning that richer countries should 
pay more based on a principle of solidarity, irrespective of whether there is evidence that 
they have directly or indirectly caused harm. The authors use the paradigms of “historical 
responsibility” and “capacity to pay” in order to propose burden-sharing arrangements 
assigning individual countries a share of the financial burden regarding climate adaptation 
costs). 
124 Carola Klöck et al., Responsibility, Capacity, Greenness or Vulnerability? What Explains 
the Levels of Climate Aid Provided by Bilateral Donors?, 27(5) ENV’T. POL. 892 (2018) 
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support would also enhance distributive equity internationally. The 
challenge, however, is to distribute the support equitably and to prioritize 
the area of climate change between mitigation and adaptation. 
Under the enhanced transparency framework, the Paris Agreement 
requires developed countries to report on international support provided,125 
whereas developing countries should report on the support needed and 
received.126 The requirement of international support can be explicitly 
pronounced as part of NDCs. There is no provision in the Paris Agreement 
which prohibits, directly or indirectly, developed countries from 
mentioning their reporting obligation as part of their respective NDCs. In 
this way, the inclusion by developed countries in their NDCs of reporting 
obligations on support would be an addition and does not require an 
overhauling of the Agreement. Explicit mention of international support 
can also assist countries in fulfilling the criteria and passing the fairness 
requirement of NDCs discussed above. The U.S. and the EU and its 
member States mention, without any reference to sustainable development, 
equity, or information regarding support provided to developing or least 
developed countries, that their economy-wide target of reducing GHGs 
emissions are “fair and ambitious.”127 However, it is strange and not legally 
in tune with the long-term goals128 of the Paris Agreement for developed 
countries not to give due consideration in their NDCs to providing relevant 
information on support delivered to developing countries. 
The need to explicitly provide for international support in NDCs is 
further supported by the fact that India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, 
Afghanistan, and the Maldives, among other nations, have explicitly made 
the implementation of their NDCs conditional upon international support in 
the form of financing, technology transfers and/or capacity building.129 
Afghanistan’s NDC, for instance, says that it would have a “conditional” 
 
(explaining that countries with more “capacity to pay” are more willing to provide for 
climate aid). 
125 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 13.9. 
126 Id., art. 13.10.  
127 The USA’s First Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 1 (2015), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/pages/Party.aspx (follow “USA First NDC 
(Archived)” hyperlink); Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the EU and its 
Member States, UNFCCC 1, 3 (Mar. 6, 2015), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/pages/Party.aspx?party=EUU (follow “European 
Union First NDC (Archived) hyperlink). 
128 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 4.1, 4.19, 7.2, 10.5, 14.1. 
129 NDC of Sri Lanka, supra note 91, at 5-7, 23-24; NDC of Afghanistan, supra note 91, at 1, 
6-7; NDC of Maldives, supra note 92, at 2-3; Bangladesh’s Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDC), UNFCCC 1, 2-4 (Sept. 2015), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Bangladesh First NDC 
(Archived)” hyperlink) [hereinafter NDC of Bangladesh].  
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13.6% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared to a BAU 2030 
scenario.130 Similarly, they have consistently argued in their NDCs that 
because of their historically minimal contribution to climate degradation 
and the least capacity for climate resilience, they must be supplied with, as 
a matter of fairness and equity, international support in the form of 
financial assistance, technology transfers and investment in areas of 
capacity building, such as agriculture, food security, irrigation, and its 
power sector, among other things.131 In this way, countries have 
incorporated in their NDCs the principle of CBDR which emphasizes that 
the success of the implementation of their NDCs depends on the support 
they receive from developed countries. 
According to one analysis, around 136 out of 168 NDCs are 
conditional upon at least one type of support: around 113 NDCs request 
capacity building support, with 110 NDCs for mitigation finance, 109 
NDCs for technology transfers, and 79 NDCs for adaptation finance.132  
Furthermore, out of the 110 NDCs requesting mitigation support, 17 are 
fully conditional and 93 are partly conditional. Notably, a higher proportion 
of LDCs and SIDS have conditional NDCs on mitigation than do other 
countries.133 Overall, around 64 (or 58%) of the countries with conditional 
NDCs on mitigation finance are either LDCs or SIDS (or both).134 This 
shows that the “solidarity” justification for allocating international support 
to countries with the least capacity is more pronounced.135 As with 
mitigation finance, the proportion of LDCs and SIDS proposing conditional 
adaptation actions is much higher than other countries: more than 60% of 
the countries putting forward adaptation finance as a condition are SIDS 
and LDCs, and most of them are lower-income countries.136 Thus, 
providing international support to these countries seems to be consistent 
with the equity-based justifications of “solidarity” and “responsibility.”137 
Though providing for flexibility, conditional NDCs bring uncertainty 
and may seriously affect the feasibility of their implementation.138 
 
130 NDC of Afghanistan, supra note 91, at 1. 
131 Id. at 2; see also NDC of Bangladesh, supra note 129, at 9, 12; NDC of 
Maldives, supra note 92, at 5-11;  INDC of India, supra note 89, at 2-3. 
132 W. P. Pauw et al., Conditional Nationally Determined Contributions in the Paris 
Agreement: Foothold for Equity or Achilles Heel?, 20(4) CLIM. POL’Y 468, 468-70, 
473 (2020). 
133 Id. at 475. 
134 Id. at 478. 
135 See generally Angela Williams, Solidarity, Justice and Climate Change Law, 10(2) 
MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 493, 509 (2009). 
136 Pauw et al., supra note 132, at 477. 
137 Klöck et al., supra note 124, at 893, 898. 
138 Pauw et al., supra note 132, at 481-82. 
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Therefore, countries are expected to provide more clarity on their 
conditional NDCs with detailed information regarding calculated and 
credible cost estimates.139 This uncertainty can be further ameliorated by 
operationalizing the CBDR-RC principle of support to developing 
countries for the implementation of NDCs,140 as an explicit requirement of 
NDCs. This will provide a factual calculation as to the cost of 
implementation of all conditional NDCs and the assistance offered as 
international support. In the absence of information regarding support, 
developed countries’ claims regarding their NDCs being fair and ambitious 
are not faithful to the central features and spirit of the Paris Agreement. In 
this context, the next subsection discusses how information regarding 
support is an essential part of equity requirements, transparency 
frameworks, and global stock-taking. 
 
C. Promoting Equity through Global Stock-take and 
Transparency Framework 
 
The Paris Agreement’s “ambition cycle” includes the binding 
obligation of each State to communicate an NDC every five years,141 the 
normative expectation of “progression” and the “highest possible ambition” 
in each successive NDC,142 and a global stock-take to assess collective 
progress towards long-term goals and to inform the Parties in updating and 
enhancing their successive NDCs and support.143 Notably, the provision on 
global stock-take explicitly covers the areas of “mitigation, adaptation, and 
the means of implementation.”144 In addition, the Paris Rulebook further 
expands the scope of global stock-take that may take into account efforts 
related to its work addressing the socio-economic consequences of 
response measures and the loss-and-damage associated with the adverse 
effects of climate change.145 In this regard, the SDGs’ approach towards 
 
139 Id. 
140 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4.5. 
141 Id., art. 4.2 read with art 4.9. 
142 Id., art. 4.3 (also placing expectations that NDCs will reflect Parties’ “common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national 
circumstances”). 
143 Id., art. 14. 
144 Id., art. 14.1. 
145 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties 
to the Paris Agreement on the Third Part of its First Session, Held in Katowice from 2 to 15 
December 2018, dec. 19/CMA.1 para. 6(b)(i)-(iii), FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (Mar. 19, 
2019) [hereinafter UNFCCC Katowice Decisions]. 
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adaptation can be useful in global stock-take to address the concerns 
regarding climate change adaptation.146 
The issue of equity in the context of global stock-take was a 
contentious matter during the Rulebook negotiations. For instance, the 
Africa Group argued that the application of objective indicators, such as 
historical responsibility, cumulative per capita emissions, different 
responding capacity due to different development levels, and sustainable 
development, would offer greater precision and rigor in assessing the extent 
to which Parties’ contributions address equity concerns.147 On the other 
hand, many developed countries objected to the application of such 
indicators arguing that the indicators could lead to selectivism, thus 
rendering the stock-take a contentious exercise.148 As a result of this, the 
Paris Rulebook does not identify and provide for the use of objective 
indicators of equity in the stock-take. However, the rules do provide that 
equity should form part of the input to the global stock-take, in a balanced, 
holistic and comprehensive manner while taking into account equity 
considerations and best available science.149 
In addition to the issue of equity, the Paris Rulebook further requires 
the State Parties to provide, as inputs to the stock-take, the information 
regarding the state of adaptation efforts, finance flows, and efforts relating 
to loss and damage.150 This can be an entry point for State Parties, 
particularly developed country Parties, to include information regarding 
support in their NDCs, thus promoting equity and making their NDCs fair 
in a realistic sense. 
Though the Paris Rulebook provides entry points for countries to infuse 
equity considerations through the global stock-take process, how the 
assessment of the adequacy of individual contributions would be carried 
out is beyond the scope of the Paris Agreement as the stock-take allows 
only assessment of collective progress of countries.151 Nevertheless, using a 
transparency framework, where all countries are to provide information 
explaining how their NDCs are fair and ambitious, would help inject equity 
 
146 Huang, supra note 86, at 224-26, 228 (also arguing that since the processes of climate 
change regime and SDGs are complementary in several ways, they should evolve hand-in-
hand with systematic integration of the several relevant aspects of the two regimes with a 
view to enhance coherence and reduce redundancies).  
147 UNFCCC, Submission by the Republic of Mali on Behalf of the African Group of 
Negotiators on Views on Issues Discussed Under Agenda Item 6 1, 1-3 (Apr. 2017), 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_nov_2017/application/pdf/compilation_26072017.pdf. 
148 Rajamani & Bodansky, supra note 114, at 1031. 
149 Decision 19/CMA.1, supra note 145, ¶¶ 2, 13, 27, 36(h). 
150 Id. ¶ 35. 
151 Rajamani & Bodansky, supra note 114, at 1037.  
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into global stock-take.152 Consequently, since equity forms part of the input 
and outcome of all components of stock-take, it would inform countries of 
the need for successive NDCs to be ambitious. However, it is essential to 
reiterate the fact that since all countries are not to be placed in the same 
category for the purpose of discharging their part of commitments, 
including those undertaken as part of the transparency framework of the 
Paris Agreement, there should be some criteria that can be used to classify 
the world’s countries into different categories corresponding to States’ 
obligations based on equity. With this in mind, the next part seeks to 
explore the criteria that can be employed to categorize and define world 
countries for the purpose of climate change. 
 
D. Promoting Equity by Adopting Nuanced Categorization of 
World Countries 
 
Most of the opposition to the Convention and Protocol stems from their 
stringent version of differentiation with almost all the burden placed on 
developed nations and almost no binding obligations on non-annexed 
countries.153 However, as pointed out by Rajmani, though the Paris 
Agreement has done away with the binary classification, it still retains the 
differentiation through reference to an undefined group of developed, 
developing, and vulnerable nations.154 The Paris Agreement makes a 
differentiation between developed and developing countries an integral 
feature, with developed countries taking the lead and developing countries 
needing the means of implementation as well as needing to ensure 
sustainable development, poverty eradication and innovation.155 For 
instance, developed countries are expected to undertake economy-wide 
absolute emission reduction targets, while developing countries are only 
“encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction 
or limitation targets” as it suits their national circumstances.156 This 
differentiation points to the fact that the Paris Agreement desired to treat 
developed and developing nations differently, and this provides a valid 
entry point for bringing differentiation into the NDCs implementation. This 
reference to the undefined category also points to the future, and challenges 
 
152 Harald Winkler, Putting Equity into Practice in the Global Stocktake under the Paris 
Agreement, 20 CLIM. POL’Y 124, 124-132 (2020). 
153 Philippe Cullet, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 28 
(1st ed. 2003); Cullet, supra note 71, at 327-28; Harris, supra note 67, at 41-42; 
Rajamani, supra note 37, at 615. 
154 See generally Rajamani, supra note 72. 
155 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, pmbl., arts 4.1, 4.4, 4.5, 9.1, 9.3, 9.5, 9.7, 10.5, 11.3, 
13.9, and 14.1.  
156 Id., art. 4.4. 
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climate negotiations to identify and resolve the categorization of 
differentiation between “developed” and “developing” countries. 
 
1. Attempting to categorize and define the world 
countries 
 
The Paris Agreement has not defined developed and developing 
nations or other vulnerable categories. The existing classifications based on 
the Annex system of the UNFCCC do not give a clear reference point to 
define developed and developing countries.157 This leaves the question of 
how to define or classify the world countries into different categories or 
groups for the purpose of climate change regime unanswered. Outside the 
climate change regime, different methodologies have been adopted to 
classify world countries into different categories based on either economic 
criteria158 or a self-selection method.159 Whether the climate change regime 
should follow the method of “self-selection,” or some other objective 
criteria based on multiple factors and subject to expert review would be 
more justifiable to the overall context of climate change. The examples of 
 
157 Izzet Ari & Ramazan Sari, Differentiation of Developed and Developing Countries for 
the Paris Agreement, 18 ENERGY STRATEGY REV. 175, 175, 179-180 (2017). 
158 For instance, the World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) classifies world 
countries into one of three broad categories: developed economies, economies in transition 
and developing economies. The criteria followed by WESP is purely based on economic 
indicators including their level of development as measured by per capita gross national 
income (GNI). Accordingly, countries have been grouped as high-income, upper-middle-
income, lower-middle-income and low-income. WESP further includes the list of least 
developed countries as decided upon by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
and the criteria followed there include a certain level of threshold with regard to per capita 
GNI, a human assets index, and an economic vulnerability index. See U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L 
ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, COMM. FOR DEV. POLICY, HANDBOOK ON THE LEAST DEVELOPED 
COUNTRY CATEGORY: INCLUSION, GRADUATION AND SPECIAL SUPPORT MEASURES, at 1-14, 
U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.A.9 (2008). While WESP follows exchange-rate based method 
(aggregation methodology), the IMF and the World Bank follow and estimate world and 
regional economic growth based on purchasing power parity (PPP) weights and GNA per 
capita (Atlas Model), respectively. See U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD 
ECON. SITUATION & PROSPECTS, 163-65 (U.N., New York 2020), https://www.un.org/ 
development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/WESP2020 _Annex.pdf; How Does the 
World Bank Classify Countries?, THE WORLD BANK, https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org 
/knowledgebase/articles/378834-how-does-the-world-bank-classify-countries. 
159 The World Trade Organization (WTO) follows a self-selection method. It recognizes 
preferential treatment given to the developing and least-developed countries. The WTO 
system, however, does not provide any definition of developing and developed countries, 
but the State members announce for themselves on the basis of the self-selection method 
whether they are “developed” or “developing” countries. See Who Are the Developing 
Countries in the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e 
/devel_e/d1who_e.htm. 
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“self-selection” are to be found in several NDCs submitted by States so far. 
For instance, while Qatar, India, and Pakistan, among others, identify 
themselves in their NDCs as developing countries,160 Bangladesh161, 
Bhutan, Tuvalu and Nepal, among others, distinguish themselves as least-
developed countries.162 Similarly, Dominica, Marshall Islands, Singapore, 
and Trinidad and Tobago, among others, call themselves SIDS.163 There are 
few countries, for instance, Kiribati and Tuvalu, who are identified both as 
SIDS and LDC.164 
The Paris Agreement does envisage differentiation, and it does not 
merely differentiate between developed and developing nations but in 
many places provides special provisions which are envisaged for 
vulnerable categories, such as LDCs, SIDS, etc.165 The need is to evolve 
some concrete mechanism of categorization between Parties which could 
be applicable in the implementation of NDCs. However, the idea of 
differentiation has been a matter of great conflict in the negotiation. G-77 
and other developing countries have been insisting on a clear 
differentiation between developed and developing countries specifically 
relating to NDCs.166  However, at the negotiation leading to the Paris 
Rulebook at Katowice, developed countries, such as the U.S. and the 
Umbrella group have demanded that the differentiation be diluted further 
and in many cases parity be set between emerging economies and 
 
160 NDC of Pakistan, supra note 91, at 5; NDC of India, supra note 89, at 4-5; State of 
Qatar’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, UNFCCC 1, 2 (Nov. 2015), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Qatar First NDC 
(Archived)” English language hyperlink).   
161 NDC of Bangladesh, supra note 129, at 9. 
162 NDC of Nepal, supra note 91, at 1; Kingdom of Bhutan Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions, UNFCCC 1, (Sep. 30, 2015) 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Bhutan First NDC 
(Archived)” hyperlink). 
163 Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) of the Commonwealth of 
Dominica, UNFCCC 1 (Sept. 2015) 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Dominica First NDC 
(Archived)” hyperlink); The Republic of the Marshall Islands Nationally Determined 
Contribution, UNFCCC 1, 7 (Nov. 22, 2018), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Marshall Islands 
Second NDC (Archived)” hyperlink); Singapore’s Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution (INDC) And Accompanying Information, UNFCCC 1 (Sep. 21, 2016), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Singapore First NDC 
(Archived)” hyperlink); NDC of Trinidad and Tobago, supra note 97, at 7. 
164 Republic of Kiribati Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNFCCC 1, 3, 11 
(Sep. 21, 2016), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (follow “Kiribati 
First NDC” hyperlink); NDC of Tuvalu, supra note 98, at 5. 
165 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 4.6, 9.4, 9.9, 11.1, 13.3. 
166 Id.; Christina Voigt, Felipe Ferreira, Differentiation in the Paris Agreement, 6 CLIM. L. 
58, 62-64 (2016). 
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developed nations. They have often claimed that the Paris Agreement does 
not provide for bifurcation. 167 But this is unethical and not based on sound 
legal principles as the Paris Agreement clearly incorporates the idea of 
differentiation between developed and developing countries.168 The 
requirement is to flush out the criteria and parameters for such a distinction. 
In the end, the NDCs Guidance refers back to the exceptions carved out 
under the Paris Agreement, such as flexibility for LDCs and SIDS under 
article 4.6 and flexibility for developing countries under article 4.4.169 No 
new categories of States with specific exceptions were created in the 
Rulebook. Instead, language, such as “as appropriate,” “as applicable,” and 
“in the light of national circumstances,” was inserted to signal the need for 
flexibility, but without differentiating among State Parties.170 
Economic development is one of the potential ways to categorize States 
for the purpose of differentiation. However, to look at the entire framework 
of differentiation from the lens of economic development would seriously 
undermine the importance of other relevant considerations such as social 
and cultural adaptation capabilities, and special vulnerability of countries 
including small island States and LDCs due to a number of factors such as 
sea-level rise and their peculiar geographical location, etc. Sands and Peel 
recognize the need for a further level of differentiation in the international 
climate change regime considering the current socio-economic and political 
realities of States particularly while differentiating between developed 
countries and major developing countries including China, India, Brazil 
and South Africa.171 In other words, the advanced version of the CBDR 
principle under the climate change regime inevitably requires its further 
improvement by analyzing the nuances of economics, socio-cultural and 
legal-political dimensions while focusing on women, youth, and local and 
marginalized communities particularly vulnerable to the adverse effect of 
climate change. 
In this scenario, differentiation based on multiple parameters can be 
developed. Parameters can include total emissions, relative emissions, 
cumulative emissions, emissions per GDP, projected emissions, 
luxury/survival emissions, total GDP, GDP per capita, human development 
index (HDI), climate vulnerability, and mitigation potential, etc. Based on 
 
167 Meena Raman, Key Challenges at COP 24, KATOWICE NEWS UPDATES AND CLIMATE 
BRIEFINGS, THIRD WORLD NETWORK 1, 2 (Dec. 2018), https://www.twn.my/title2/climate/ 
fullpdf/katowice01.pdf. 
168 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 3, 4.1, 4.4-5, 4.15, 5.2, 6.6, 7.2-3, 7.6-7, 7.13-14, 
9.1, 9.3, 9.5-9, 10.5-6, 11.1-4, 13.2-3, 13.9-15.   
169 Decision 4/CMA.1, supra note 105, ¶ 4, annex I, ¶¶ 1(c) and 6, annex II, ¶ 1(b). 
170 Rajamani & Bodansky, supra note 114, at 1030, 1034. 
171 Sands & Peel et al., supra note 4, at 247-8. 
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these indexes and parameters, countries can be divided into types I, II and 
III, thus reflecting the true essence of CBDR-RC. Countries could be 
categorized as developed, developing and least developed according to 
their HDI ranking and vulnerability status. This could be re-evaluated and 
revised every 10 years or at a time decided by the State Parties. The above 
classification of countries into type I, II, and III categories would provide 
the much-needed clarification to the developed and developing categories 
of countries and their varied obligations as provided under the Paris 
Agreement. It would also help adjudicate the adequacy and ambitious 
nature of NDCs. This classification system would help streamline the scope 
and subject matters of NDCs discussed in the next section. It would also 
ease the task of evaluation by pertinent technical and scientific bodies (such 
as Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice), manage 
expectations of the international community, and assist the task of the 
implementation and compliance branch of the Paris Agreement to examine, 
evaluate, and follow-up on the collective progress under global stocktake. 
Finally, categorizing countries on identifiable, objective criteria is essential 
as placing countries individually would defeat the purpose of equity, which 
is the cornerstone of the climate change legal framework.  
 
E. Promoting Equity through Expanding the Scope of NDCs 
 
Though the Paris Agreement requires countries to submit their NDCs, 
what constitutes the content of the NDCs has been a matter of contention. 
Developing nations insist on the principle of equity172 and CBDR-RC along 
with emphasis on the full scope of NDCs, including mitigation, adaptation, 
and means of implementation. Developed countries, however, view NDCs 
as being mitigation-oriented only.173  The Rulebook provides that as far as 
the contents and the information to be provided for the NDCs are 
concerned, the information is without prejudice to the inclusion of 
components other than mitigation.174 This is viewed by developing 
countries as a major win on the scope of NDCs, which not only relates to 
mitigation contributions but may include an adaptation component, along 
 
172 Summary of the Lima Climate Change Conference: 1–14 December 2014, 12 EARTH 
NEGOT. BULL. 1, 28, 29 (2014). 
173 See Pieter Pauw et al., Subtle Differentiation of Countries’ Responsibilities Under the 
Paris Agreement, 5 (86) PALGRAVE COMMUN. 1, 5-6 (2019); W. Pieter Pauw et al., Beyond 
Headline Mitigation Numbers: We Need More Transparent and Comparable NDCs to 
Achieve the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 147 CLIMACTIC CHANGE 23, 26–27 
(2018); EARTH NEGOT. BULL., supra note 172, at 27-28; Summary of the Katowice Climate 
Change Conference: 2–15 December 2018, 12 EARTH NEGOT. BULL. 1, 13 (2018).  
174 Decision 4/CMA.1, supra note 105, ¶ 8; Rajamani & Bodansky, supra note 114, at 1029-
31. 
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with the necessary means of implementation.175 This needs to be made 
mandatory for consistency and certainty, otherwise, it may have the effect 
of overlooking the holistic response needed to address multidimensional 
aspects of climate change and diminishing the importance attached to 
adaptation and other aspects of climate change. It is also necessary to 
measure the progress of countries under the global stock-take process. It is 
interesting to note that the Paris Agreement provides an opportunity for 
States where they are allowed to submit their adaptation-related 
information as part of their NDCs: States are free to submit their adaptation 
communication as a component of or in conjunction with their national 
adaptation plan or NDC or national communication.176 This provision can 
be a valid justification for most of the countries that have made their 
domestic adaptation plans part of their NDCs. More than that, this 
provision can also form a valid entry point for developed nations providing 
information related to adaptation actions taken domestically and support 
provided internationally, thus promoting equity and fairness through the 
implementation of their NDCs. 
Furthermore, the language of article 3 of the Agreement also 
emphasizes the fact that States’ NDCs are not limited to the issue of 
mitigation only but cover other issues related to adaptation, finance, 
technology, and transparency framework. Article 3 says that: “As 
nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate 
change, all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as 
defined in articles 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13.” This article implies two 
meanings. First, “nationally determined contributions” (i.e., NDCs) are 
meant to be applied against the “global response [which is not limited to 
only mitigation response] to climate change.”177 Because of the wider scope 
of the term “global response to climate change,” the concept of NDC can 
be construed in such manner so as to include in its content the issues of 
adaptation and means of implementation. Second, as a result of this, States 
are required under their NDCs to “undertake and communicate ambitious 
efforts” regarding adaptation and international support. In sum, article 3 is 
a valid legal justification for the countries and a requirement to include in 
their NDCs the efforts which they have taken regarding adaptation and 
 
175 Rajamani & Bodansky, supra note 114, at 1037-38.  
176 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 7.11. 
177 The term “global response” to climate change is an inclusive term which includes the 
issues of mitigation, adaptation, human rights, vulnerability, gender, sustainable 
development, and means of implementation including financial assistance, technology 
transfer and investment in capacity building areas which result in maximization of co-
benefit approach. Example of this has already been given under the various provisions 
(preamble as well as the operative part) of the Paris Agreement. See id. pmbl., arts. 2.1, 3, 
4.1, 7.1, 7.2, 9.3, and 10.5.  
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support pursuant to their obligations under the relevant provisions of the 
Agreement. 
It is also important to point out that expanding the scope of NDCs 
would not require major overhauling of the Paris Agreement, but is in 
consonance with the spirit and objective of the Paris Agreement as the 
Agreement makes explicit references to human rights, sustainable 
development, and contents of SDGs. The implementation of these goals 
would require providing for information and taking into consideration 
economic and social development, gender issues, indigenous and local 
communities, and international cooperation, among other things. This 
aspect can only be taken care of when we expand the scope of NDCs 
beyond mitigation to cover adaptation, loss-and-damage, and international 
support, etc.178 This point would also be in consonance with the fact that 
climate change is not only an environmental challenge, but also one of the 
biggest developmental threats in terms of varied economic consequences of 
climate change,179 and thus requires a holistic response.180 
In addition to mitigation, the expansion of NDCs’ contents to include 
other aspects is ingrained in the equity and the north-south difference. 
Developing nations who have not contributed historically to climate change 
are the biggest victims of climate change and therefore, they need to adapt 
to climate change immediately. Therefore, adaptation has emerged for 
developing nations as a major concern required to be addressed at all 
levels, from the local to national to regional. Effective adaptation would 
require a comprehensive strategy taking into account economic and social 
considerations. This would also be in consonance with, and can be used to 
enhance, the Paris Agreement’s adaptation goal of “establishing the global 
goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience 
and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to 
sustainable development.”181 
 
178 Sébastien Duyck et al., Human Rights and the Paris Agreement’s Implementation 
Guidelines: Opportunities to Develop a Rights-Based Approach, 12(3) CARBON 
& CLIM. L. REV. 191-202 (2018). 
179 Richard S. J Tol, The Economic Impacts of Climate Change, 12(1) REV. OF ENV’T. 
ECON. & POL’Y 4, 8-12 (2018); see also OECD, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 11-13 (OECD Pub., 2015) (providing a detailed global quantitative assessment of 
the direct and indirect economic consequences of climate change in a selected economic 
sectors). 
180 Graeme Taylor, A Realistic (Holistic) Approach to Climate Mitigation, 8(3) WORLD 
FUTURES REV. 141, 141-161 (2016); see also Jolly & Trivedi, supra note 30 (discussing the 
role of Hybrid law as a holistic response to solve the problems of climate-induced 
displacement). 
181 See Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 7.1. 
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Further expanding the scope of NDCs to adaptation with a provision 
for financial assistance, technology transfer and other areas would require 
considerable attention to economic and social development components 
and would ultimately help the wider interpretation of CBDR-RC to non-
environmental contexts. When the CBDR principle is applied to the 
environmental context and environmental-related global goals (such as 
climate change mitigation), the underlying idea for differentiation lies in 
the heart of historic responsibility; in case of non-environmental related 
global goals (such as social and economic development), the core idea for 
differentiation thrives at the center of different national “capacities and 
priorities” which each State carries. The application of the CBDR principle 
to non-environmental related global goals, however, is dependent upon the 
varying degree of national “capacity” of each State, such capacity, 
especially in terms of financial accumulation and technology advancement, 
has been built up (in the case of developed countries) and adversely 
affected (in the case of developing countries) as a result of historical 
reasons. In this way, the CBDR principle should be applied even to those 
cases where historical responsibility has not been mentioned as one of the 
reasons for differentiation (especially in matters of economic and social 
development) since the different degrees of each State’s capacity is [may 
necessarily be] an inevitable result of those historical actions. 
The differentiation in NDCs could be further extended to the case of 
compliance mechanisms whereby countries could be asked to provide 
information about implementation status.182 Article 15 of the Paris 
Agreement envisages the establishment of a committee that shall be expert-
based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, 
non-adversarial and non-punitive.183 The committee shall pay particular 
attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of 
Parties. Modalities and procedures developed for the Compliance 
Committee specifically state that its work has to “be guided by the 
provisions of the Paris Agreement, including . . . article 2,” which refers to 
 
182 Christina Voigt, The Compliance and Implementation Mechanism of the Paris 
Agreement, 25(2) REV. OF EUR., COMMUNITY & INT’L ENV’T. L. 161, 166-68 (2016). 
183 Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 15; see generally, Sebastian Oberthur & Eliza 
Northrop, The Mechanism to Facilitate Implementation and Promote Compliance with the 
Paris Agreement 1-24 (Project for Advancing Climate Action Transparency Working Paper 
2018), https://www.wri.org/publication/pact-compliance-mechanism; Lavanya 
Rajamani, Elaborating the Paris Agreement: Implementation and Compliance, 2017 CTR. 
FOR CLIM. AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS; Achala Abeysinghe & Subhi Barakat, The Paris 
Agreement: Options for an Effective Compliance and Implementation Mechanism, 
INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T AND DEV.; Alexander Zahar, A Bottom-Up Compliance Mechanism 
for the Paris Agreement, 1 CJEL. 69, 70-71 (2017); Wang Ruibin, Implementing the Paris 
Agreement: Achievements and Constraints, 63 CHINA INT’L STUDIES 83 (2017). 
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sustainable development and equity as operational principles.184 In 
addition, “[t]he Committee shall pay particular attention to the respective 
national capabilities and circumstances of Parties, recognizing the special 
circumstances of the [LDCs] and [SIDS], at all stages of the process, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement, including in 
determining how to consult with the Party concerned, what assistance can 
be provided to the Party concerned to support its engagement with the 
Committee, and what measures are appropriate to facilitate implementation 
and promote compliance in each situation.”185 Further it is provided that the 
financial “assistance should be provided, upon request, to developing 
country Parties . . . to enable their necessary participation in the relevant 
meetings of the Committee.”186 This explicit reference to, and treatment of, 
differentiation provides a scope for bringing differentiation to compliance 
mechanisms and also points to the need to identify and resolve the 
categorization of differentiation between “developed” and “developing” 
countries. Based on the above analysis, it is suggested that developed 
countries are expected to integrate into their NDCs obligations of providing 
transparent and consistent information on support, and to expand the scope 
of their NDCs incorporating adaptation plans and providing information 
and explanation on how their NDCs are fair and ambitious in the context of 
sustainable development. This paper has argued for the division of NDCs 
by building on the differentiation provided under the Paris Agreement. This 
would provide nuanced categorization and offer clarity on who is to 
provide support and who should be the beneficiaries. Such clarity at 
normative level becomes important where article 4.5 of the Agreement is 
silent on it. For UNFCCC Parties to practically avail the benefits of equity 
and provisions of the Paris Agreement on support, the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) 
needs to adopt a decision providing more clarity about the categorization of 
countries into different categories based on the indicators broadly 
highlighted above. The basis for such categorization and differentiation is 
already provided for under several provisions of the Agreement. The 
problem would nevertheless be regarding how to further develop those 




The adoption of SDGs, with their complementary nature and integrated 
relationship of environment and development, contributes to achieving the 
 
184 UNFCCC Katowice Decisions, supra note 145, dec. 20/CMA.1 annex I, ¶ 3. 
185 Id., annex, ¶ 19(c). 
186 Id., annex, ¶ 27. 
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climate goals of adaptation and mitigation. The climate change regime, on 
the other hand, provides a legal basis and normative tools for States’ efforts 
towards realizing the fruits of sustainability. In this complementary 
process, equity plays an important role as a driving force to implementing 
States’ NDCs in light of their national circumstances. Equity under the 
climate change regime is channeled through the application of the principle 
of CBDR-RC, which is a living principle and still evolving.187 States’ 
submission of NDCs suggest that the NDCs can provide opportunity for 
achieving not only the Paris Agreement temperature goal of 2 degrees 
Celsius, but overall long-term goals of building a resilient society with the 
idea of “leaving no one behind” focusing on youth, women, and vulnerable 
sections of society. Thus, the evolutionary principle of CBDR-RC, needs to 
be reframed and widely interpreted in the overall context of sustainable 
development. While the adoption of SDGs with the idea of “leaving no one 
behind” provides a solid foundation with political legitimacy, the 
incorporation of CBDR in the SDG outcome document opens up the 
possibility of incorporating and applying CBDR to all dimensions of 
sustainable development. The wider interpretation of the CBDR-RC 
principle, therefore, must be extended and applied in the implementation of 
NDCs. This would also be in consonance with many NDCs revealing the 
significance attached to sustainable development and SDGs. 
The Paris Agreement encompasses several legal provisions, and thus 
provides a way for this wider interpretation to become applicable to all 
aspects of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. 
Following the Paris Agreement, equity could be promoted under the 
climate change regime through implementation of NDCs, while expanding 
the scope of NDCs explicitly covering mitigation and adaptation targets 
with detailed information. Equity could also be promoted through fairness 
requirements of NDCs. This aspect of equity would, however, face legal 
challenges in defining the parameters of fairness. Further, there is an urgent 
need for classification of countries into different categories based on 
multiple factors including climate vulnerability, gender considerations, and 
differing levels of economic and human development and corresponding 
capacity of States. This explicit reference and treatment for differentiation 
provides the scope for bringing differentiations to compliance mechanisms 
and also points to the need to identify and resolve the categorization of 
differentiation between “developed” and “developing” countries and their 
varied obligations as provided under the Paris Agreement. Differentiation 
will help to adjudicate the adequacy and ambitious nature of the NDCs. 
 
187 See Daniel Bodansky & Lavanya Rajamani, The Issues that Never Die, 12(3) CARBON 
& CLIM. L. REV. 184, 188-190 (2018). 
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Conditional NDCs if provided international support could further enhance 
equity at the next level. However, it is important to balance the equity 
considerations with those of efficacy requirements: too much emphasis on 
conditional NDCs could affect the efficiency of NDC implementation. 
Thus, conditional NDCs remain both an opportunity and a potential 
vulnerability for ambition and equity. To this end, to promote equity and 
justify fairness through the transparency framework provided under the 
Paris Agreement, developed countries are, nevertheless, expected to come 
out with NDCs incorporating detailed quantified information regarding 
international support provided to developing countries, LDCs, and SIDS. 
They are also expected to provide detailed explanations of how their NDCs 
are “fair and ambitious,” and to ensure that their NDCs will be 
implemented in the context of sustainable development. The lack of 
information regarding international support in the NDCs of developed 
countries may raise the question of how successive NDCs of developing 
countries with higher ambitions will be financed. In this regard, developing 
countries are also expected to come out with detailed NDCs, adding 
substance to their international support needs with information regarding 
calculated and credible cost estimates. Thus, developing and developed 
countries are expected to provide all this information regarding 
international support received and delivered, respectively, in terms of 
providing financial assistance and technology transfer and investing in 
capacity-building measures of developing countries. Because climate 
change negotiations and issues of equity are an ongoing process, CMA 
should start giving deference to new equity considerations and adopt 
guidance on how NDCs can be implemented with focus on a holistic 
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